Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Volume 14 | Issue 1

Article 1

2016

Making civilian drones safe: performance
standards, self-certification, and post-sale data
collection
Henry H. Perritt
Chicago-Kent College of Law

Albert J. Plawinski

Recommended Citation
Henry H. Perritt and Albert J. Plawinski, Making civilian drones safe: performance standards, self-certification, and post-sale data collection,
14 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2016).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol14/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Copyright 2016 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property

Volume 14, Number 1 (2016)

Making civilian drones safe: performance standards,
self-certification, and post-sale data collection
By Henry H. Perritt* & Albert J. Plawinski **
ABSTRACT
With millions of small drones in private hands, the FAA continues its struggle to
develop an effective regulatory regime to comply with Congress’s mandate to integrate
them into the national airspace system. Thousands of individuals and small businesses
have obtained authorization from the FAA—"section 333 exemptions"—allowing them to
fly their drones commercially. Farmers, TV stations, surveyors, construction-site
supervisors, real estate agents, people selling their properties, and managers seeking
cheaper and safer ways to inspect their facilities, want to hire the exemption holders, but
many are holding back until the FAA clarifies the groundrules.
The FAA understands that its traditional approach for testing and licensing pilots,
scrutinizing every detail of a new aircraft before it can be flown, and controlling flight
operations of helicopters and airplanes have little relevance to the risks presented by
small drones. In any event, traditional aviation regulations are unenforceable against
tens or hundreds of thousands of drone owners who know nothing about the FAA or the
FARs, are not part of the aviation culture, and who fly mainly in their backyards or
customers’ parking lots.
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Ultimately, the agency will be drawn to regulate drones at the point of sale—to
say to Amazon: "you can't sell one of these unless it has certain built-in safety
capabilities—unless it is law-abiding out of the box.” The FAA acknowledges that the
traditional approach to "airworthiness certification,” which costs tens of millions of
dollars and takes years is not the answer for a $1,000 DJI Phantom 3.
Law-abiding drone performance standards must define performance capabilities rather
than engineering details; they must allow manufacturers to self-certify compliance—just
as they do with computers, Wi-Fi equipment, automobiles, and trucks. Automatic postsale data transmission by the drones will permit manufacturers and the FAA to analyze
actual behavior, thereby refining their understanding of actual, rather than theoretical,
risks, and to determine the reliability of automated safety systems. Lawless drones will be
subject to recalls in extreme cases, and designers and manufacturers will pay the price in
tort liability for reckless decisionmaking.
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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) acknowledges that its traditional
processes for assuring the safety of airplanes and helicopters are unsuitable for the growing
number of small drones:
[T]he FAA’s current processes for issuing airworthiness . . . certificates were
designed to be used for manned aircraft and do not take into account the
considerations associated with civil small UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems] . . . .
[O]btaining a type certificate and a standard airworthiness certificate . . . currently
takes about 3 to 5 years . . . . [I]t is not practically feasible for many small UAS
manufacturers to go through the certification process required of manned aircraft.
This is because small UAS technology is rapidly evolving at this time, and
consequently, if a small UAS manufacturer goes through a 3-to-5-year process to
obtain a type certificate, which enables the issuance of a standard airworthiness
certificate, the small UAS would be technologically outdated by the time it
completed the certification process. For example, advances in lightweight battery
technology may allow new lightweight transponders and power sources within the
next 3 to 5 years that are currently unavailable for small UAS operations. 1

¶2

Some advocates for traditional aviation and engineers of $15 million military drones 2
sneer at small UAS as “toys,” 3 but Amazon sold 300,000 small civilian drones in 2014.4
More than 2,000 purchasers have gone to the trouble of filing petitions with the FAA, under
Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (“Section 333”), 5 for
exemptions to permit them to fly the drones commercially, and the FAA has granted more
than 2,000 Section 333 exemptions.6 These exemptions cover, among other things, support
for precision agriculture, motion picture and television production, event photography,
newsgathering, and infrastructure inspection. 7 The market for drones is outrunning
regulation, despite broad agreement that some kind of regulation is appropriate to mitigate
the risks associated with widespread use of drones.
1
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9549 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter NPRM].
2
MQ-9 Reaper, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx
[http://perma.cc/L7ER-3FGH] (reporting 2006 price of $64.2 million for a package of four Reaper drones).
3
See Chris Cole, Drones Aren’t Just Toys that Cause a Nuisance. They’re Still Killing Innocent People,
THEGUARDIAN (Mar. 20 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/20/drones-nuisancekilling-innocent-people [http://perma.cc/L5D8-K58L] (lamenting attention given to "toys" rather than
military drones).
4
Alan Levin, Santa Delivering Drones for Christmas Amid Rising Safety Concern, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS (Dec. 17, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-17/santadelivering-drones-for-christmas-amid-rising-safety-concern [http://perma.cc/4326-LR97] (reporting
Amazon sales of 10,000 per month); Jason Reagan, Drone Sales Figures for 2014 are Hard to Navigate,
DRONELIFE (Jan. 24, 2015), http://dronelife.com/2015/01/24/drone-sales-figures-2014-hard-navigate/
[http://perma.cc/5T5J-7L9G] (evaluating various sales figures, most in the hundreds of thousands or more).
5
See FFA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, § 333, 126 Stat. 11, 75-76 (2012).
6
Section 333, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/ [https://perma.cc/D6N5-K2G8?type=source]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (reporting 2,020 Section 333 petitions granted as of 22 October 2015).
7
See FFA Modernization and Reform Act § 333.
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On July 9, 2014, Modovolate Aviation 8 filed a petition for rulemaking with the FAA
proposing that the FAA streamline the regulation of microdrones by imposing pre-sale
technology requirements that would make the drones law-abiding right out of the box,
obviating the need for detailed conventional operating rules and pilot certification
requirements. 9 Eight months later, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(“NPRM”), 10 proposing a new part 107 to the Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”) that
would establish operating rules and a new category of airman certification for drone
operators (“DROPs”). Subsequently, in a series of articles, the managers of Modovolate
Aviation explained how the law-abiding-drone approach fits within the overarching
regulatory regime proposed in the NPRM. 11
A lingering question is how the law-abiding-drone proposal can be implemented
without imposing requirements that suffer from the vices of traditional airworthiness and
type certification. This article addresses that question.
It argues that the FAA can specify the characteristics of a law-abiding drone by
imposing performance requirements regarding autonomous safety features, allowing selfcertification of compliance by drone vendors, and by making use of the extensive flight
and system-performance data already being collected in thousands of microdrone flights.
Performance standards alone, however, are not enough. The FAA might still require
preapproval before sale premised on the vendors demonstrating that performance standards
are satisfied. Similarly, self-certification by vendors is not enough; test protocols to ensure
satisfaction of the performance standards may be so extensive that substantial cost and
delay would result before the vendor can certify compliance.
The FAA should, following the example of the FCC, prohibit sale of any drone for
which the vendor has not issued a certificate of conformity. This would certify that the
vendor has done whatever is necessary to assure safety and the reliable operation of certain
fail-safe features. It would be left entirely up to the vendor to determine the basis for such
self-certification.
Drone safety will be backstopped by the possibility of product recalls and tort
liability for vendors who do not install reliable autonomous safety systems and for
consumers who disable them.
Part II of the article explains how regulation of all kinds works best when it focuses
on bottlenecks 12 in the chain of distribution, and that drone regulation should concentrate
on the point of sale rather than on thousands of individuals and small businesses flying
drones. Part III summarizes the FAA’s traditional airworthiness and type certification
process for airplanes and helicopters and explains why it is unsuitable for drones. Part IV
acknowledges that point-of-sale requirements for autonomous safety features easily can
8

Modovolate Aviation, LLC (www.movoaviation.com) is an Illinois limited liability company founded
and controlled by Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and Eliot O. Sprague.
9
Modovolate Aviation, LLC, Petition for Rulemaking Seeking the Regulation of Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (July 9, 2014).
10
NPRM, supra note 3.
11
See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 385 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP Discipline: Training and
Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 143 (2015).
12
A “bottleneck,” in general, is a narrowing of a channel that restricts the flow through it. Referring to
commerce, the term is a metaphor for places that concentrate the flow of goods, such as a publisher’s
printing plant concentrates the flow of books and an ecommerce portal concentrates the flow of goods sold
on line.
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become burdensome airworthiness certification but argues that a system of performance
standards, self-certification by drone vendors, and safety performance data collected after
sale can avoid the risk, while preserving the safety benefits. Part V presents a proposed
FAA rule to effectuate the article’s recommendations. Part VI explains how tort law sits in
the background to encourage best practices by drone vendors.
II. THE CASE FOR REGULATING THE BOTTLENECK
¶9

The cost, delay, and innovation drag associated with vehicle airworthiness
certification are reasons for avoiding vehicle requirements altogether. Indeed, that
proposition persuaded the FAA to issue the NPRM. That NPRM’s central theme is that the
relatively modest risks associated with microdrones do not warrant the costs, delays, and
innovation drag of traditional airworthiness certification. 13 Instead, the NPRM focuses on
operator certification and operating limitations and avoided imposing any requirements as
to the vehicle, except for an upper weight limit.14 This approach is equally impractical,
however. Enforcing operator certification requirements and operating limitations against
thousands of individuals and small businesses flying low-cost drones and having no
previous connection to aviation regulations is infeasible. 15
¶10
In 1983, MIT political science professor Ithiel de Sola Pool explained that effective
regulation must focus on bottlenecks in the regulated activities in order to be effective. 16
As an example, he discussed how copyright regulation had always focused more on
bottlenecks like printers, publishers, and booksellers, rather than end users. The number of
end users is so large, and their assets so small, that chasing them is infeasible. Instead,
chasing a smaller number of bottlenecks with more assets is far more efficient. He
advocated applying this principle to regulating emerging computer networking
technologies.
¶11
De Sola Pool’s insight also applies to drone regulation. Trying to detect rule
violations committed by thousands of individuals and small businesses with no tie to the
traditional aviation culture is unworkable.
¶12
The only solution is to regulate a bottleneck—the point of sale—and to prohibit the
sale of drones unless they have built-in safety features.
III. TRADITIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AND TYPE CERTIFICATION

¶13

Traditional airworthiness and type certification of drones is not the solution, as the
opening quotation acknowledges, despite the literal requirement that drones have such
certification.
13

NPRM, supra note 3, at 9548-49 (characterizing lower risk and noting practical infeasibility of
subjecting microdrones to manned-aircraft certification process).
14
See id. at 9546 (summary of proposed rule).
15
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law and Order in the Skies, TECH (June 13, 2014),
http://tech.mit.edu/V134/N28/drones.html [http://perma.cc/H747-W7TM]; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O.
Sprague, Leashing Drones: Don’t Drone Me Bro’, ROTORCRAFT PRO, July 2014, at 37; Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
& Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding UAVs, ROTOR & WING MAG. (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/issue/features/Law-Abiding-UAVs_82916.html#.VgXIrbz9yf4
[http://perma.cc/XVG8-YVR5]; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law Abiding Drones:
What to Tell Clients that Want to Use Drones in Their Business, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2014, at 1.
16
See generally ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (Belknap Press) (1983).
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The Federal Aviation Act says that a "person may not . . . operate a civil aircraft in
air commerce without an airworthiness certificate in effect or in violation of a term of the
certificate . . . ." 17
An “aircraft” is "any contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in,
the air." 18 A “civil aircraft” is “an aircraft except a public aircraft.” 19 A "public aircraft" is
an aircraft owned or operated for a federal, state, or local governmental entity. 20 “Air
commerce" is "foreign air commerce, interstate air commerce, the transportation of mail
by aircraft, the operation of aircraft within the limits of a Federal airway, or the operation
of aircraft that directly affects, or may endanger safety in, foreign or interstate air
commerce." 21
Under these definitions, drones are aircraft, because they are contrivances that are
used and designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.
The statute obligates the FAA Administrator to prescribe aircraft airworthiness rules:
"minimum standards required in the interest of safety for appliances and for the design,
material, construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and
propellers . . . ." 22
The Administrator may grant an exemption from the requirements if he finds that the
exemption is in the public interest. 23
The FAA has promulgated extensive rules for aircraft airworthiness and type
certification. 24 Part 27 of the FARs, for example, prescribes airworthiness standards for
normal category helicopters. 25 Among many other things, an applicant for an airworthiness
certificate must determine the minimum rate of descent, the airspeed, and the best angle of
glide airspeed at maximum weight at rotor speeds determined by the applicant. 26 An
applicant must also construct a height-speed envelope portraying combinations of height
and forward speed from which a safe landing cannot be made in autorotation after an engine
failure. 27
The applicant must show compliance with the following standards:
(a) By tests upon a rotorcraft of the type for which certification is requested, or by
calculations based on, and equal in accuracy to, the results of testing; and
(b) By systematic investigation of each required combination of weight and center
of gravity if compliance cannot be reasonably inferred from combinations
investigated. 28

17

49 U.S.C. § 44711(a)(1) (2015).
Id. § 40102(a).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. § 44701(a)(1).
23
Id. § 44701(f).
24
14 C.F.R. §§ 21–50 (2015).
25
Id. § 27.
26
Id. § 27.71.
27
Id. § 27.87.
28
Id. § 27.21.
18
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The applicant must "make all flight tests that the FAA finds necessary to determine
compliance with the applicable [airworthiness standards]." 29
¶21
The FAA has published a 1023-page advisory circular explaining how to meet the
airworthiness certification requirements for normal category rotorcraft. 30 The circular
explains that the applicant conducts the flight tests, with follow-up "verification tests"
conducted by the FAA itself. 31 Further, it prescribes the order in which the applicant should
conduct flight tests for specific requirements. 32 It explains that a 150-hour flight-test
program must be conducted, unless the aircraft incorporates new engine types, in which
case 300 hours are required. 33 During the tests, "all components of the rotorcraft should be
periodically operated in sequences and combinations likely to occur in service." 34 A range
of representative ambient operating conditions and sites should be part of the tests. 35 It
prescribes how flight test results, including parameter values, should be captured and
recorded. 36
¶22
The result of these certification rules is a process that takes years and costs millions
of dollars. 37
¶23
Despite decades-long efforts to simplify the process for experimental and homebuilt
aircraft, the airworthiness and type certification process remains burdensome. During this
process, the FAA evaluates the plan for amateur-built aircraft. 38 Builders must submit
applications for registration 60-120 days before contemplated completion of assembly. 39
Before granting an airworthiness certificate, the FAA inspects amateur-built aircraft, 40
including "an onsite, visual, general airworthiness certification inspection of the aircraft,"41
and recommends involvement of designated airworthiness representatives (DAR's) before
the inspection occurs. 42 The inspection may require some disassembly. 43 The FAA
29

Id. § 21.35.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AC NO. 27-1B, CERTIFICATION OF NORMAL
CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT (2014),http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_271B_thru_Chg_6.pdf [http://perma.cc/9J7F-YRDN]
31
Id. at FAR 21-2.
32
Id. at FAR 21-2-3.
33
Id. at FAR 21-3 (referring to 14 C.F.R. § 21.35(f)(1) and (2)).
34
Id. at 21-5(iii).
35
Id. at 21-5(vi).
36
Id. at 21-5 to 21-6.
37
See generally What Does It Cost to Certify a New Aircraft?, AIRLINERS.NET,
http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/2666549/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/HG7V-5ZWM] (estimating cost of certifying A380 as exceeding 100 million Euros);
Changing the World for General Aviation Airplane Manufacturing, GAMA,
http://www.gama.aero/node/12004 (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/FF42-HH8F] (asserting that
the cost of airworthiness certification can be cut by half); Aircraft Certification Process Review and
Reform, GAMA, http://www.gama.aero/files/downloads/FAA-ACPRR-Report-to-Congress-2012-08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HVA5-R2XR?type=source] (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (reviewing decades-long pressure
for FAA to reform airworthiness certification process).
38
See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AC 20-27G, CERTIFICATION AND OPERATION OF
AMATEUR-BUILT AIRCRAFT ¶ 8(j)(3) (2009),
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC 20-27G.pdf [http://perma.cc/64NCM5YM].
39
Id. ¶ 9(a).
40
Id. ¶ 12.
41
Id. ¶ 12(b).
42
Id. ¶ 12(a)(2).
43
See id. at 24 (Figure 3).
30
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inspection includes review of inspections by certificated mechanics or other
builders/commercial assistance providers, builders’ construction log entries, logbooks and
maintenance covering the aircraft, engine, and propeller or rotor blade(s), and
Experimental Aircraft Association (“EAA”) technical counselors’ visit report cards. 44
Builders often must provide photographs documenting construction details. The inspection
and records review substantiates sound workmanship methods, techniques, and practices. 45
¶24
The inspection is followed by a flight test "appropriate for the applicant to show the
aircraft is controllable throughout its normal range of speeds and maneuvers and that the
aircraft has no hazardous operating characteristics or design features." 46 Flight tests must
span twenty-five to forty hours 47 and follow recommended flight test procedures. 48 The
FAA may require additional flight test hours. 49
IV. AVOIDING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
¶25

Point-of-sale requirements specifying technological capabilities easily morph into
traditional airworthiness and type certification requirements. The question is how to avoid
that slippery slope. The answers are to prescribe performance, rather than design standards,
to allow self-certification of compliance and to minimize the cost of testing. To avoid that
slippery slope, it is also useful to review the basic thinking surrounding regulatory reform
from the mid-1970s. The foundational choice for policymakers is between self-regulation
(essentially the market) and some kind of governmental requirements. 50 But even if the
government imposes standards or requirements, they can be enforced in various ways. For
example, regulatory regimes can require preapproval of new systems before they can be
put into use, they can rely on reports by the regulatees and they can rely on inspections and
audits.
A. Reliance on markets

¶26

Government regulation is not necessary in all cases. In fact, most goods and services
in the economy are not regulated.
¶27
If a particular seller’s drones consistently do not perform as advertised, word will
spread, and demand for that seller’s products will decline. Larger enterprises, both those
selling drones and those operating them, usually have insurance to protect them against
loss. Insurance coverage depends upon compliance with limitations imposed by the insurer.
Those limitations often represent greater restrictions on flight than would be imposed by
government regulators. A prime example is the requirement for a certain number of turbine
44
Id. ¶ 12(c)(1). EAA technical counselors are experienced mechanics and experimental aircraft builders
who volunteer to assist other builders. EAA Technical Counselors, http://www.eaa.org/en/eaa/aviationcommunities-and-interests/homebuilt-aircraft-and-homebuilt-aircraft-kits/eaa-homebuilt-airplaneprograms-and-resources/eaa-technical-counselor-program.
45
Id. ¶ 12(c).
46
See id. at 26 (Figure 4).
47
Id. at 27.
48
Id. (referring to AC 90-89).
49
Id. ¶ 14(b).
50
See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 185–186 (1995) (reviewing history of regulatory reform and criticism of
command-and-control regulation; advocating greater use of "audited self-regulation").
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hours for turbine helicopter pilots to be covered under commercial insurance policies. The
FARs impose no such requirement.
Relying on markets does not promise a return to the Wild West; markets impose
constraints on participants. Sellers sell only what buyers demand, or they do not stay in
business for long. If there is no market for 16-rotor drones with an endurance of only five
minutes, sellers will not try to sell them. Buyers’ activities are limited by what is available
from sellers. If one can only buy a drone with geofencess that exclude them from prohibited
airspace in Washington, buyers will not fly drones in those areas. If a seller programs a
drone so that it will not take off unless it has GPS lock and a functioning return-to-home
feature, buyers will not be able to fly without return-to-home capability.
The law, of course, is never entirely absent from commerce. If a drone seller promises
certain safety features or other capabilities, and they do not work as advertised, the buyer
always can bring a breach of warranty claim against the seller. The common law of
contracts imposes an obligation on sellers to deliver what they have promised. Sellers can
disclaim warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, but only up to a point.
The common law of torts protects third parties. If the drone experiences a flyaway
and hits someone on the head, the victim may recover damages in a negligence action –
assuming she can prove some kind of injury or loss. If the DROP deliberately flies a drone
into a person or a thing, the common law of battery and trespass provides for damages.
Gradations exist in the balance between market reliance and government regulation.
A market for a particular product, say very small drones, might be completely unregulated
by any government agency, or it might be subjected to fairly detailed regulation. In most
cases, the constraints will be a mixture of supply and demand and regulatory mandates.
As this article proposes, the FAA could set performance standards for autonomous
safety features and let the market take care of enforcement. A buyer who discovers that the
safety features of her drone do not meet the requirements of the performance standard could
bring a breach of warranty claim against the seller. A third-party injured by a drone that
does not satisfy the performance standard would use that violation of the standard to
establish liability in a tort action. The FAA would not play any role in the common-law
enforcement process; instead, enforcement would be a matter for buyers and sellers, private
lawyers, and the regular courts.
To be sure, there would be disputes in both types of cases as to the relationship among
the performance standard, the drone’s equipment and capabilities, and whatever incident
triggered the dispute. The drone manufacturer would be expected to defend on the grounds
that the incident was caused by operator error and not by any defect in the drone systems;
the claimant would argue that a deficiency in the systems was the primary or sole cause of
the incident. Both sides would present evidence, and a fact finder – judge or jury—would
decide, based on the evidence, what the actual facts were.
But there is nothing unusual about that. Factual controversies are the core of any
enforcement action, whether it is taken by a government agency enforcing its own rules or
whether it crops up in a private lawsuit. Constitutional due process guarantees require that
the disputants have adequate procedures to resolve contested facts before government
agencies or courts can impose any kind of penalty or economic burden on them.
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B. Exempting small drones from regulation
¶35

¶36

¶37

¶38
¶39

The most fundamental regulatory policy question for FAA regulation of drones is
whether government regulation is necessary at all. No apparent reason exists, for example,
to subject very small toy drones to FAA regulation, because they pose minimal risk.
The Hubsan X4 (H107C) is a good example. It weighs 1.75 ounces and costs $47. It
is extremely unlikely to cause damage or injury regardless of how it flies, because of its
low kinetic energy.
In its NPRM, the FAA explicitly invited comment on UAS American Fund’s
proposal to exempt drone weighing less than three pounds from regulation altogether,
except for the most basic flight envelope limitations.
The question is: what constitutes a toy? Is a toy anything below a certain weight?
What should that weight be?
If the lower boundary of regulation is defined in terms of weight, it is not clear why
regulation should depend on the purpose of use. Why should a particular vehicle be
unregulated when it is used as a toy and regulated when the same vehicle is used to earn
compensation? The classification is made more difficult because even the smallest
microdrones, like the Hubsan, have some kind of camera capability, which will tempt some
users to use it for commercial photography.
C. Impose performance standards rather than design standards

¶40

The Office of Management and Budget requires federal agencies to prefer
performance standards: 51 "To the extent feasible, agencies should specify performance
objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated
entities must adopt." 52
¶41
The final report of the Clinton Administration's White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
said, "all new rules should be rewritten as performance-based regulations." 53
¶42
The FAA recognizes the superiority of performance standards over design standards,
particularly in the drone context:
It is well understood that regulations that are articulated in terms of the desired
outcomes (i.e., “performance standards”) are generally preferable to those that
specify the means to achieve the desired outcomes (i.e., “design” standards).
According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A–4 (“Regulatory
Analysis”), performance standards “give the regulated parties the flexibility to
achieve the regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way.

51
See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 340–41 (2005)
(distinguishing performance standards, design standards, and best-available-technology standards and
briefly summarizing criticisms of each).
52
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 2,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysisa-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQT6-GBPU].
53
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Final Report to President Clinton (1997),
http://fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html [http://perma.cc/8DYQ-4QW8]. The Commission was established by
Executive Order 13015 on August 22, 1996.
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Design standards have a tendency to lock in certain approaches that limit the
incentives to innovate and may effectively prohibit new technologies altogether.
The distinction between design and performance standards is particularly
important where technology is evolving rapidly, as is the case with small UAS.54

¶43

In the air and water pollution contexts, for example, a performance standard can be
set at the effluent levels achievable by the best available technology, while leaving the
choice of the particular technology to be used to the regulated entity. 55
¶44
This preference for performance standards does not, however, steer the FAA away
from certification of compliance by an administrative agency, as opposed to selfcertification. And FAA involvement in certifying compliance with performance standards
can be extensive.
¶45
FAA regulations for flight simulators provide an example of performance standards.
For example, 14 C.F.R. § 60.1 requires persons using simulators to meet airman
qualification requirements to comply with performance standards set forth in appendices
to the rule. 56 Some of the language sets forth straightforward performance requirements:
"A flight dynamics model that accounts for various combinations of air speed and power
normally encountered in flight must correspond to actual flight conditions, including the
effect of change in helicopter attitude, aerodynamic and propulsive forces and moments,
altitude, temperature, mass, center of gravity location, and configuration." 57
¶46
But this performance-oriented language is buried in a multipage set of detailed
specifications which include requirements to submit to FAA inspector oversight of factory
test runs and to submit extensive QTG 58data. Before the data even can be collected:
[T]he sponsor should submit to the NSPM for approval, a descriptive document
(see Table C2D, Sample Validation Data Roadmap for Helicopters) containing the
plan for acquiring the validation data, including data sources. This document
should clearly identify sources of data for all required tests, a description of the
validity of these data for a specific engine type and thrust rating configuration, and
the revision levels of all avionics affecting the performance or flying qualities of
the aircraft. Additionally, this document should provide other information, such as
the rationale or explanation for cases where data or data parameters are missing,
instances where engineering simulation data are used or where flight test methods
require further explanations. It should also provide a brief narrative describing the
cause and effect of any deviation from data requirements. The aircraft
manufacturer may provide this document. 59

54

Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9552 (Feb. 23, 2015).
Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition Relief,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1581, 1597 (2011) (explaining that performance standards allow for technological
innovation, while design standards do not, in the context of water-pollution regulation); see also Timothy
V. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons From the War Against Command and Control,
58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 310–19 (2010) (arguing superiority of performance standards, and evaluating how
they are used by EPA in regulating air pollution).
56
14 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2008).
57
Id. pt. 60 app. C tbl.C1A Item 2.a. (Minimum Simulator Requirements).
58
Qualification Test Guide ("QTG") is a document containing test results and statements of compliance
with standards).
59
Id. pt. 60 app. C sec. 9(g) (FFS Objective Data Requirements).
55
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Performance standards similarly could be used for airworthiness and type certification of
droness, but that does not answer the question of how the certification process can be
designed so that it does not take years and cost millions of dollars.
¶47
Environmental regulators set performance standards based on the level of
performance a particular technology can deliver. The ultimate standard does not require
use of that technology, but the link between them ensures that there is at least one way to
comply with the performance standard. The same approach is useful in developing
performance standards for drone return-to-home systems. The problem with deriving a
performance standard from the performance of an actual technology is that it can have the
effect—intended or unintended—of locking in proprietary technology. Much of the law of
standard-setting has evolved from deliberate attempts to set a standard to confer a
proprietary advantage. 60 Many of the controversies in contemporary standard-setting relate
to designers’ reluctance to give up their intellectual property, and their competitors’
opposing unwillingness to pay their competitors to license its intellectual property in order
to comply with the standard. 61
¶48
An approach more hospitable to competition would involve someone—either the
FAA itself, NASA, or a private association—sponsoring a competition among competing
return-to-home subsystems, collecting data, and the FAA setting the performance standard
based on the data collected. That kind of laboratory/experimental approach is widely used
when any new technologies enter the marketplace, but the effort takes time and does not
immediately generate revenue and return on investment.
¶49
One disadvantage of any performance-based regulatory standard is unpredictability.
A regulatee has flexibility to choose how to meet the performance standard, but he has no
guarantee that the regulator or a court hearing a civil claim may not reach a different
conclusion, after the fact, about the most appropriate way to meet the standard. Uncertainty
can be reduced by publication of a non-exclusive safe harbor. A regulatee may apply
different standards at its discretion, but if it seeks more certainty, it can apply the published,
safe harbor standard. By proving that it followed the published standard, it has protection
against being found in violation or being held liable. Antitrust guidelines published by the
Department of Justice 62 are a good example of this approach.
D. Allow self-certification
¶50

Preapproval represents the greatest burden on the regulatees and the greatest barrier
to innovation. That approach is what the FAA mostly relies on to certificate aircraft,
operators, and airman. So a fundamental question in crafting a simple approach to drone
regulation is whether the preapproval strategy can be replaced by self-certification. It can;
60

See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658 (1961) (holding that
complaint alleging refusal to give seal of approval to plaintiff's gas burner for anti-competitive reasons
stated antitrust claim); Cryptography Research Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass'n, No. C 04–04143 JW, 2008
WL 5560873, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (citing Radiant Burners in support of denial of motion to
dismiss claim that standard setting organization denied certification for reasons unrelated to objective
merits of technology).
61
See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software Patents, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 229 (2005) (discussing controversy over public key encryption and RSA
software patent).
62
ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL CH. VII (5th ed. 2015)
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/05/13/chapter7.pdf [http://perma.cc/8STB-A42R].
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in fact, self-certification is the prevailing way to assure compliance with safety standards
in non-aviation industries, such as motor vehicles, consumer products, and consumer
electronics.
1. Self-certification of compliance with motor vehicle safety standards
¶51

Anyone is prohibited from selling or distributing a motor vehicle unless it complies
with federal safety standards. 63 The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to prescribe
standards. 64
The Secretary of Transportation reasonably may require a manufacturer of a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment to keep records, and a manufacturer,
distributor, or dealer to make reports, to enable the Secretary to decide whether the
manufacturer, distributor, or dealer has complied or is complying with this chapter
or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter. 65

Manufacturers must certify compliance to the next entity in the stream of commerce—for
example, to dealers 66—and must also affix a certificate of compliance to the vehicle. 67
¶52
Manufacturers are responsible for doing whatever they deem necessary to certify
compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs). "This is a selfcertification process as opposed to the type of approval process which is used in some other
countries such as Japan. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)
does not issue approval tags, stickers or labels for vehicles or equipment items before or
after the first sale." 68 NHTSA does not specify test procedures or quality control programs.
Those are decisions left to the manufacturer. 69
2. Self-certification of compliance with Consumer Product Safety requirements (CV)
¶53

The Consumer Product Safety Act 70 establishes an independent regulatory
commission, the Consumer Products Safety Commission (“CPSC”), authorized to develop
“uniform standards for consumer products” and to reduce conflict between federal
regulation and state and local regulation. 71 The CPSC may promulgate a consumer safety
rule 72 so long as it prepares a description, based on findings, of the “potential benefits and

63

49 U.S.C. § 30112 (2012) (prohibition on selling noncompliant vehicles).
Id. § 30111.
65
Id. §30166(e).
66
Id. § 30115 (requiring certification of compliance).
67
49 C.F.R § 567.4 (2013) (requiring certification placard).
68
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPLIANCE TESTING PROGRAM
(Aug. 18, 1998), http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/testing/comply/Mission/1_ovsc_1.html
[http://perma.cc/DS3M-MT4F]. Accord, Stephen P. Wood, et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of
Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1435 (2012) (asserting that
"NHTSA does not certify or approve products"; self-certification is the regulatory approach).
69
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 68.
70
15 U.S.C. § 2053 (2012).
71
Id. § 2051.
72
Id. § 2058.
64
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potential costs” 73 and alternatives to the rule. 74 Additionally, the consumer safety rule must
be “reasonably necessary” 75 and in the “public interest.” 76 The consumer safety rules must
be expressed as performance standards. 77 It is unlawful to “sell, offer for sale, manufacture
for sale, distribute in commerce, or import into the United States any consumer product”
not in conformity with the applicable consumer safety rule. 78
a) Product certification in general.—A consumer product subject to the applicable
safety rule requires certification. 79 The certification includes testing of the product to
ensure conformity with the safety regulations. 80 Specific consumer safety rules define
certification procedures for the products they cover.
b) Children’s products.—The Consumer Products Safety Improvement Act
(CPSIA) 81 sets regulations for “children’s products” and rules for compliance by the
manufacturers or importers into the United States. 82 The product must comply with
children’s product safety rules, be tested for compliance by an accredited laboratory,
provide evidence through a certificate of the product’s compliance, and have a tracking
number that contains information about the manufacturer, location of production, and
details about the manufacturing process. 83
Full-size baby cribs are an example of a children’s product that must comply with the
CPSC’s regulations. The regulation defines full-size baby cribs as beds for infants within
a range of inner dimensions. 84 “[F]ull-size baby crib[s] shall comply with all applicable
provisions of ASTM F1169-13, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Full-Size
Baby Cribs.” 85 Manufacturers must obtain a copy of the specifications from ASTM
International, the American Society for Testing and Materials. 86 Current revisions of the
ASTM for full-size cribs include: limit to movable sections, slat joint construction in lieu
of finger or lateral joints, and warning label visibility. 87
c) Lawn mowers.—Walk-behind lawn mower manufacturers and importers must
certify their safety compliance by labeling their products accordingly. 88 The manufacturer
or importer must issue certificates of safety based on a “reasonable testing program.”89
Unlike children’s products, such as cribs, walk-behind lawn mowers do not require
certification at an accredited laboratory. 90 A manufacturer can establish a “reasonable
73

Id. § 2058(f)(2)(A).
Id. § 2058(f)(2)(B).
75
Id. § 2058(f)(3)(A).
76
Id. § 2058(f)(3)(B).
77
Id. § 2056(1)(1).
78
Id. § 2068(a)(1).
79
Id. § 2063(a)(1).
80
Id.
81
Consumer Products Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008).
82
See The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpsia [http://perma.cc/SN4V-3YJ5].
83
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 2063(5)(A).
84
16 C.F.R. § 1219.1.
85
16 C.F.R. § 1219.2.
86
Id.
87
Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Full-Size Baby Cribs, ASTM
http://www.astm.org/Standards/F1169.htm [http://perma.cc/4SHD-6J4E].
88
16 C.F.R. § 1205.30.
89
Id.
90
Id. § 1205.33.
74
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testing program” through which testing “provides reasonable assurance” of the safety
standards. 91 A manufacturer can divide products into production lots and certify an entire
lot by only testing a sample. 92 If the product fails the testing, the manufacturer cannot
certify any member of the production lot unless the manufacturer makes necessary
adjustments for safety conformity. 93
¶58
The CPSC standards for walk-behind lawn mowers require the manufacturer to
conform to specifications for rotor shields, 94 mower controls, 95 and warning labels. 96 Each
specification includes technical drawings and testing procedures, including areas of
inspection and testing conditions. Rotor shields, for example, require testing on a smooth,
level surface, with inflated pneumatic tires, the highest level setting, and the rotor blade set
to the lowest position. 97 Conformity with these standards allow manufacturers to selfcertify their product.
¶59
This self-certification scheme mirrors verification and declaration of conformity
procedures of electronic consumer devices described in subsequent sections. Selfcertification of products requires recordkeeping by the manufacturer. For lawn mowers,
the manufacturer must keep certification records, including test results and lot information,
for three years. 98 This allows the CPSC to inspect manufacturer test records and ensure
that the manufacturer complies with safety standards.
3. Certification of compliance by consumer electronics devices
¶60

The FAA's expressed interest in special treatment for micro UAS draws support from
other areas of regulation, such as the FCC’s regulation of consumer electronics devices..
The argument for subjecting them to a lighter regulatory touch proceeds from their limited
capacity to cause damage and injury. Likewise, unintentional radio frequency (“RF”)
radiators pose some risk of RF interference, but not nearly as much as intentional radiators.
Accordingly the FCC’s regulatory regime, aimed at reducing the risks of RF interference,
allows self-certification of compliance by the vendors of low-risk unintentional radiators.
The FCC does, however, prescribe default testing procedures even for these vendors.
Intentional radiators, posing a higher risk, must be certified by the FFC in advance of sale.
¶61
The FCC regulations 99 define classes of electronics for the purpose of certification.
A consumer device can be an intentional, an unintentional, or an incidental radiator; an
intentional radiator emits radio frequencies through induction or radiation, an unintentional
radiator emits internal radio frequencies, and an incidental radiator emits radio frequencies
but was not designed for that purpose. 100 An electronic manufacturer can self-certify its

91

Id. § 1205.33(b)(1).
Id. § 1205.33(b).
93
Id. § 1205.33(b)(4).
94
Id. § 1205.4.
95
Id. § 1205.5.
96
Id. § 1205.6.
97
Id. § 1205.4(b).
98
Id. § 1205.34.
99
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.1 et seq. (2014).
100
Id. § 15.3.
92
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product through Verification 101 or a Declaration of Conformity, 102 or it can seek
Certification 103 prior to marketing, pursuant to FCC requirements. All methods require
manufacturers to test their products and take the necessary measurements to “ensure that
the equipment complies with the appropriate technical standards.” 104 Certification,
however, requires the applicant to submit measurements and test data for approval. 105 The
FCC does not require manufacturers to send their product for approval unless specifically
requested, 106 but the FCC requests test measurements for Certification. Whether a
manufacturer requires a Declaration of Conformity (“DoC”) or Certification depends on
the class of radiator and type of electronic device—discussed in a subsequent paragraph.
The level of burden depends on the type of spectrum occupied. The devices that
require Verification simply receive signals and do not transmit. The devices that require a
DoC transmit signals but occupy unlicensed spectrums. The devices that require
Certification occupy licensed and congested spectrum. The following types of electronic
equipment authorizations are listed in ascending order by their level of compliance burden:
a) Verification.—Devices like FM and Television broadcast receivers can self-certify
through verification. By verification, the manufacturer determines that the product
complies with FCC technical standards. 107
Unlike DoC and Certification, Verification requires testing at any laboratory—the
laboratory need not be accredited. Manufacturers must design products to comply with
FCC regulations that govern radio frequency emissions. For devices that connect to the
public utility power lines, the product shall not exceed limits of radio frequency voltage
introduced back into the AC power lines. 108 Products also have limits on radio frequency
emissions measured from various distances. 109
The FCC requires the responsible party to maintain documents with technical
drawings and specifications, records and procedures of product testing, and record of
measurements taken at the test site. 110 Upon the FCC’s “reasonable” request, the
manufacturer must submit “one or more sample units for measurements at the
Commission's Laboratory.” 111 Failure to comply within fourteen (14) days will lead to
forfeiture or other administrative sanctions. 112
b) Declaration of Conformity (DoC).—The Declaration of Conformity by a
manufacturer signifies that the product complies with FCC regulations. 113 DoC does not
differ from Verification except that a DoC requires testing by an accredited laboratory. 114

101

Id. § 2.902.
Id. § 2.906.
103
Id. § 2.907.
104
Id. §§ 2.906–2.907.
105
Id. § 2.907.
106
Id.
107
Id. § 2.952.
108
Id. § 15.107.
109
Id. § 15.109.
110
Id. § 2.955.
111
Id. § 2.956.
112
Id. § 2.946.
113
Id. § 2.906.
114
See Equipment Authorization Procedures, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/oet/ea/procedures.html [https://perma.cc/WV6F-9XKT].
102

17

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2016

The FCC requires the same document maintenance 115 and may request a sample product
for testing. 116
¶67
A Declaration of Conformity is sufficient for Consumer Industrial, Scientific, and
Medical (“ISM”) devices like WiFi Access Points (“APs”). 117 Access points operate in
unlicensed frequency bands, meaning that the FCC did not reserve and allocate specific
frequencies for specific licensees. WiFi APs operate on the 2.4 GHz spectrum, 5 GHz
spectrum, or both unlicensed spectrums. Manufacturers must test their products in an
accredited laboratory equipped with an anechoic chamber to take measurements of their
devices. One of these measurements is antenna power. 118
¶68
c) Certification.—Certification of a product requires the manufacturer to submit the
product test results and measurements and seek authorization by the FCC or the
Telecommunication Certification Body (TCB). 119 The manufacturer must submit an FCC
Form 731 including technical measurements that show compliance with the FCC
requirements. 120 Rules govern the measurements required for particular devices. Devices
that use authorized radio services, like cell phones, require the following measurements:
RF power output, modulation characteristics, occupied bandwidth, spurious emissions at
antenna terminals, field strength of spurious radiation, and frequency stability. 121 Cell
phones must conform to the specifications under 47 C.F.R. pt. 22 subpart H, which outlines
permissible channel usage, radiation limits, and frequency band operation by cellular
devices.
E. Minimize pre-sale testing requirements
¶69

Applying safety standards, whether they are performance or design-based, whether
a government agency must approve a product before it is sold, or whether a vendor can
self-certify compliance with the standards, almost always involves some form of testing.
To reduce the cost of drone-vendor compliance with FAA safety standards, vendors must
be in a position to decide how much pre-sale safety testing they want to do, as compared
with post-sale data collection to verify compliance.
1. Fault analysis

¶70

Requiring autonomous return-to-home capability is a good example of the challenge,
and it is almost certain to be included in any conceivable set of vehicle requirements. 122
115

47 C.F.R. § 2.1075 (2014).
Id. § 2.1076.
117
An access point (AP) is not what is commonly referred to as a router. What consumers generally
consider a router includes a device that directs traffic between the local area network (LAN) and the wide
area network (WAN) called the router, a network switch that allows multiple physical connections into the
device, and a wireless access point (AP) that allows wireless connection with the network.
118
47 C.F.R. § 15.247 (2014) (limiting antenna power to 1 watt). See also FCC Rules Dictate Antenna
Use, BITSTORM, http://www.bitstorm.com/fcc-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/K75S-6Y8Y] (last visited Sept.
24, 2014).
119
47 C.F.R. § 2.907 (2014).
120
Id. § 2.1033.
121
Id. § 2.1041; see also id. §§ 2.1046–2.1057.
122
This return-to-home function applies in local drone missions within the line of sight. The drone can
travel a maximum distance equivalent to half the maximum charge of the battery from the launch position;
the battery must have sufficient charge to support a journey back. When the FAA lifts the limit on line of
116
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Stating the general performance requirement is straightforward. For example, proposed
language for such a requirement would state: "the aircraft must have a return-to-home mode
that, when triggered, causes it to return to the launching point and land without DROP
intervention.”
It is similarly straightforward to impose tolerances for the landing point, such as,
"within 2 feet of the launching point."
The reliability of the return-to-home function presents difficulties if the return-tohome system works only some of the time. Then it will have only limited safety benefits.
A pure performance-based approach to reliability would add a proviso that the return-tohome feature must work a certain percentage of the time, say 99.5%. But why 99.5% as
opposed to 85% or 92% or 99.6%? The most appropriate figure, theoretically, should be
based on a balancing of the magnitude of the cost of a failure weighed against the cost of
compliance, but that requires data, and there is not much data yet for microdrone returnto-home system functionality. There is even less data on the cost of drone accidents.
Beginning with the components of the system, fault analysis can create a failure rate
estimate. Additionally, fault analysis can begin quantifying the cost of improving the
failure rate from the cost of an additional component or a more reliable component.
Redundancy almost always improves reliability, and it is not difficult to determine the cost
of a backup system, which also would reduce endurance because of power consumption
and weight.
Analytically, aviation reliability engineering requires: (1) inventorying every fault
that can occur in every aircraft component, (2) quantifying the probability of that fault
occurring, and (3) assessing the risk of failure.
An example of reliability engineering would be the failure of a pitch link on a
helicopter rotor blade. The probability of this occurring depends on the design of the link
and the properties from which it is made. A failure in the pitch link would be catastrophic.
Asymmetries left between the two rotor blades would probably cause the rotor blade to
separate from the rotor hub.
In a microdrone, a fault might occur in the power supply to one rotor because the
soldered connection of one of the motors that leads to the power distribution board has
failed, resulting in an open circuit to that motor. The probability of failure of soldered
connections is relatively high because wire connections, in which the only strength is
provided by the solder itself, are brittle and weak. The consequences of failure of a soldered
connection would not likely be catastrophic in a multi-rotor design because the thrust of
the rotors still in operation can be ramped up to ensure stable flight or at least a controlled
landing.
Another fault could be a capacitor failure on an integrated semiconductor circuit
board, rendering a microdrone’s GPS navigation system inoperative. The consequences of
an inoperative GPS navigation system depends upon the drone’s alternative navigation
capabilities.

sight operation of drones and drones become truly autonomous (not requiring a DROP to intervene), drones
should have pre-programmed coordinates of safe landing zones along the travel route. In R&D scenarios, a
package traveling from point A to point B should include coordinates of landing zones to avoid traveling
back to the starting position. This also increases the drone’s effective travel distance because the furthest a
drone can travel is equivalent to requisite battery charge left and the nearest safe landing point.
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The three-step process—inventorying possible faults, assessing probability, and
quantifying risk— is known as fault analysis, which also recognizes that multiple faults
can occur at more or less the same time. Thorough fault analysis must consider all of the
possible permutations of faults.
A fault tree quantifies the results of a fault analysis. From there, probability analysis
multiplies and adds the probabilities to determine the joint probability of various
combinations of multiple faults.
After the complete fault analysis process identifies faults, estimates their
probabilities, and assesses their consequences, then the designers and regulators decide
what should be done to reduce the risk of failure. One possibility is to redesign the failing
component to reduce the probability of failure occurring. Depending on the way in which
the failure such as that of the pitch link occurred, the component link could be redesigned
to be made of stronger material, to be larger in dimension, or to attach the link to the pitch
horn of the blade or to the upper swashplate in a different way.
Going back to the example of a broken solder connection, assembly procedures could
be modified to require that the wire be mechanically connected before it is soldered, as by
wrapping the wire around or hooking it through a terminal, or twisting two wires together
before the connection is soldered.
If redesign is not likely to be cost-effective, redundancy is another corrective action.
Each rotor blade could be equipped with two pitch links, either one strong enough to adjust
the pitch of the rotor blade throughout its operating range. Two power connections for each
leg of the electrical circuit could be provided for each motor.
Another mitigating strategy is to revise component specifications so as to narrow
operating limits in terms of speed, temperature, or turbulence.
Increasing automation means that more of the critical aircraft systems are
implemented by computer software rather than by mechanical structures, assemblies,
connections, and movements. Faults in software are far more likely to be due to mistakes
in coding logic than due to physical failure, such as failure of a disk drive or a solid state
storage device containing the software. In the world of computer programming, fault
analysis and mitigation is known as debugging. The more complex the program, the more
difficult it is to debug. A programming fault may manifest itself in the overall failure of
the system of which it is a part. A program may cease execution or produce wrong values,
but isolating the exact cause of the program anomaly is a challenge. Advancing the frontier
of reliability engineering for aircraft requires better techniques for fault analysis of
computer software and automating them.
In many cases, the best solution for a programming error is some means of indicating
failure of a system or of a component, allowing a backup system to take over, or alerting
the pilot or DROP. Triggering an alarm system allows the pilot to utilize training, human
instincts, and ingenuity to take appropriate corrective action, which is not programmed into
any of the systems in advance.
When the engine of a single-engine helicopter fails, it is less important for the pilot
to know whether it was a tooth on the bevel gear in the main transmission that failed than
it is for him to know that the propulsion system as a whole has failed. To make sure the
pilot recognizes such a failure immediately, helicopters are equipped with both an
annunciator light and an aural alarm for low rotor RPM, an immediate manifestation of an
engine failure.
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Engineering science permits the designers of physical components to determine the
component’s strength and other properties and thus to determine the conditions under
which they will break, bend, or suffer fatigue processes likely to resolve into eventual
fatigue fractures.
But mechanical parts often behave differently under real-world conditions than
theory can predict. Data on actual behavior is essential for adequate failure analysis, and
data is often unavailable in sufficient quantities to complete feasible fault analysis before
an aircraft enters operation.
Usually, a full fault analysis is not possible until after an aircraft system is in service
for many months or years. Before that, averages of test results can be used, but averages
such as mean time between failure (MTBF) are not enough. Failures often exhibit wide
deviations around the average. A particular fault may have such a catastrophic consequence
that it may jeopardize safety even if it occurs only at the 10%, 5% or 1% probability level,
even though the average failure rate suggests adequate reliability.
Several vulnerabilities exist in drone safety systems. A power lead from a
microdrone motor might detach from a poorly soldered connection. Wiring connections on
or between integrated circuit boards can develop faults because of vibration or impacts
encountered in use or because of manufacturing defects. Electronics hardware can
malfunction because of overheating, moisture, or dust.
Far more likely, points of failure involve the three different RF links involved in
drone missions: the control link, the GPS link, and the Internet connection. Control link
failure is the most basic of these, but when that happens, well functioning autonomous
safety protocols can resolve the situation safely. Almost all of the autonomous safety
protocols depend upon GPS lock. Complete loss of control requires the loss of the control
link and GPS lock. Live Internet connectivity is not essential for safe flight, but it is
necessary to provide live telemetry to customers and vendors and to provide moving map
displays to DROP and photog. 123
On the microdrone systems marketed in 2015, control links are implemented by
spread spectrum modulation 124 of frequencies in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz band, 125 with
some vendors selecting the 5.7 GHz band instead. 126 Sometimes the control link
piggybacks on top of a Wi-Fi connection; 127 in other cases, the control link uses coding
123

in newsgathering-helicopter and drone parlance, a “photog” is the camera operator.
Spread-spectrum modulation is a system for splitting information into tiny slices of content that are
transmitted separately on each of a hundred or more frequencies in a band of RF spectrum. See K. H.
Torvmark, Frequency Hopping Systems, TEX. INSTRUMENTS,
http://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra077/swra077.pdf [http://perma.cc/76Z5-9NQ6] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015)
(explaining spread spectrum); see generally U. S. Patent No. 7,990,874 (granted Aug. 2, 2011) (reviewing
history and characteristics of spread spectrum technologies). WiFi uses spread spectrum modulation. Syed
Masud Mahmud, Spread Spectrum and Wi-Fi Basics, WAYNE ST. U.
http://ece.eng.wayne.edu/~smahmud/ECECourses/ECE5620/Notes/Wi-Fi-Lecture.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G6K5-PBDB] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (explaining how WiFi uses spread spectrum
modulation).
125
Phantom 3 Professional & Advanced, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-3/spec
[http://perma.cc/N63J-HHVV] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
126
Craigi, Basics of Radio Frequencies for FPV Quadcopter Drones, DRONEFLYERS (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.droneflyers.com/2014/11/basics-radio-frequencies-fpv-quadcopter-drones/
[http://perma.cc/YP2H-F6WJ] (reviewing frequencies used by popular drones).
127
Drone and UAV Tech., 3DR, http://3drobotics.com [http://perma.cc/Q2MY-75A2] (last visited Sept.
24, 2015).
124
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and modulation schemes similar to those used by Wi-Fi but independent of it. 128 The range
of control link signals is limited to a half-mile or so. 129
Interference from the other strong sources of RF energy, such as high tension power
lines or broadcast radio and television antennas, can disrupt the control link, as can
congestion on the relevant frequency band from other Wi-Fi users. Heavy cellphone usage
is unlikely to interfere, because the frequencies are different. 130 Dense materials such as
structures and hills attenuate these frequencies and can result in loss of the control link
when they come between the DROP and the drone.
GPS operates by means of a receiver and associated processing software that
triangulate RF signals received from a multiplicity of GPS satellites. The receiver is
passive; it is not a transmitter, and no handshake is involved with the GPS satellite. All the
receiver needs to do is to be able to see and hear the requisite number of satellites. The
satellites transmit on two frequencies: 1575.42 MHz (L1) and 1227.60 MHz (L2). 131
Typical drone GPS implementations require anywhere from 6 to 12 satellite signals to
perform the necessary computations. 132 When this occurs, a state known as "GPS lock"
exists. The frequencies involved suffer significant attenuation from physical objects such
as foliage, structures, and precipitation, and so it is not unusual for the requisite signals to
be unavailable or intermittent in particular circumstances.
Internet connectivity in the field usually depends on a data connection through a
cellphone provider; WiFi-based Internet links rarely are available where drone missions
are flown. In the typical DJI, 3DRobotics, or Parrot AR configuration, Internet connectivity
is provided by the user’s cellphone or tablet computer, operating in the 869–894 MHz and
1850–1990 MHz bands, 133 while the drone and DROPCON limit themselves to providing
GPS and control links on other frequencies.
A cellular data connection is not required, however, to realize the basic flight and
video functionality of cellphone or tablet computers in these configurations; the cellphone
or tablet communicates with the drone and the DROPCON via Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or both.
If the user wants Internet connectivity, he must have a cellular data subscription. In the
absence of Internet connectivity during missions, the user can upload recorded data later,
when Internet connectivity is available, after the flight.
Of the three kinds of RF connectivity, cellular data is the most reliable; although,
cellular coverage is limited in some places and in some circumstances, as when congestion
is high during music concerts or athletic events.

128
A drone vendor could design and deploy its own control link hardware that would use some or all of
the 802.11 standard without relying on off-the-shelf WiFi products.
129
Phantom 3 Professional & Advanced, supra note 127.
130
U.S. cellphones operate on the 800 MHz and 1.9 GHz frequency bands; WiFi operated in the 2.4 and
5.8 GHz bands. Cellular Frequencies and Bands in Use Today, CRITERION CELLULAR,
http://www.criterioncellular.com/tutorials/bandsandfrequencies.html [http://perma.cc/P8WW-JNTS] (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015) (summarizing cellphone frequencies).
131
GPS Signals, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_signals [https://perma.cc/3PPW-WBFC]
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
132
Tom Clark, How a GPS Receiver Gets a Lock, GPSINFORMATION.NET
http://gpsinformation.net/main/gpslock.htm [http://perma.cc/7RHT-5WQ4] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015)
(explanation by amateur radio operator of how a device gets a GPS lock).
133
Cellular Frequencies, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellular_frequencies
[https://perma.cc/3BJJ-FHRQ] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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The most important thing to understand in terms of safety systems failure analysis is
how joint failures of the control link and the GPS system could occur.
2. Test protocols
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Test protocols specify how a system or subsystem should be tested to ensure that it
meets its design goals. Control surfaces such as ailerons can be tested in a wind tunnel, by
measuring the relationship between degrees of aileron deflection and the resulting moment
at the wing root at various air speeds. Structural strength can be tested destructively by
applying steadily increasing loads at the wingtip and measuring the load at which the wing
root attachment fractures. Crash resistance, say of a LiPo battery container can be tested
by subjecting the battery casing to various kinds of puncture loads to determine the
puncture force at which the battery case is penetrated.
All of these examples can be accomplished fairly quickly, given the right test
equipment. Other kinds of tests, however, require much more data and sufficient time to
collect the data. Testing for fatigue tolerance of a structural component requires repeatedly
loading and unloading the structure until failure occurs or a crack can be detected. Testing
for system reliability requires the application of enough use cycles to derive a statistically
valid measure of mean time between failures. Tens of thousands of use cycles often are
required to collect the necessary data.
In any test protocol, failure, e.g. the fracture of a wing root in testing wing strength,
must be defined. Additionally, the event or phenomenon whose relationship of failure is
being tested must be defined – loading and unloading the wing in the fatigue-tolerance
example.
Microdrones are exceedingly unlikely to suffer structural failure in ordinary use, in
the sense that the booms would separate or the central bay for the electronics would
collapse. Certain components may experience physical failure; however, a rotor blade
could come off in flight or a battery attachment could fail in flight, resulting in separation
of the battery. Testing for these kinds of physical failures requires application of traditional
techniques for measuring component attachment reliability. Additionally, the tester must
determine the kinds of flight profiles or phenomena likely to cause the fault to be manifest:
perhaps sudden changes in torque for the rotor blade, turbulence, or other causes of abrupt,
extreme acceleration in the case of the battery attachment.
The greatest concern for microdrone safety, however, is not failure of structural
components; it is the reliability of safety systems. A drone with automatic take off,
automatic landing, automatic hover, geo-fencing, and automatic return-to-home poses little
risk. The concern is the behavior of the vehicle when one or more of these autonomous
safety features fails to operate as intended. Return-to-home is the most basic autonomous
safety feature. When it works properly, the DROP can trigger the feature when he is about
to lose control or is otherwise uneasy with the drone behavior. The vehicle’s onboard safety
systems can trigger it when the battery reaches a certain level of discharge, when the drone
flies outside a defined height and distance envelope, or when the control link is lost.
Understanding the potential for failure starts with understanding how the feature
works. Almost all microdrone return-to-home systems start with calculation of GPS
coordinates, at least twice, when the drone is launched, to determine the home position and
again to calculate present position when return-to-home is triggered. Calculation of a vector
that connects two sets of coordinates is a straightforward application of trigonometry, but
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the return-to-home subsystem must have an algorithm that performs the calculation. The
control subsystem must be able to fly the path with some means of detecting deviation,
probably requiring additional GPS-coordinate input from the GPS subsystem. Calculation
of GPS coordinates depends on the availability of signals from enough GPS satellite signals
to achieve “GPS lock.”
Conceptually, the design of a test protocol for return-to-home subsystem reliability
is straightforward. The tester performs a large number of flights to different radii from the
DROP in different directions and different proximities to obstacles and triggers the returnto-home at least once on each test flight. Each success and failure is recorded, along with
all the flight parameters and profiles.
The challenge, and the main driver of cost and duration, is not only that many—
probably thousands—of flights are necessary to collect the necessary data, but also that
multiple causes of return-to-home failure exist – even as a theoretical matter; never mind
real-world complications. To function successfully, any return-to-home subsystem must
(1) know where the vehicle is when the feature is triggered; (2) it must know where home
is; (3) it must be able to calculate a path from its present position to home; (4) it must
communicate that path to a navigation system capable of causing the drone to fly the path;
(5) the path must be one that the drone’s thrust, climb and descent capabilities permit it to
fly; (6) the path must not be interrupted by obstacles; (7) the drone’s return speed must be
greater than opposing wind; and (8) and the remaining battery charge must be sufficient to
fly to the launching point.
Failure of steps (1) and (2) results from not having GPS lock at the points when
coordinates are recorded. Failure of step (3) can result from a mis-designed algorithm, data
errors in the coordinates input to it or a hardware fault as the algorithm is being executed.
Failure of step (4) can result from a poor physical connection, data errors, or misalignment
of data-structure frames. Failure of step (5) could result from the commanded path
requiring altitudes, speeds, or turn rates exceeding the drone’s performance capabilities.
Failure of step (6) results if the drop has flown around or above a tree, pole or building on
the outbound flight. Failure at step (7) can result if the drone flew downwind on its
outbound flight, or if the wind speed has increased during the flight or is greater at a higher
altitude at which the drone is flying. Failure at step (8) results from the battery’s exhausting
its charge.
A comprehensive test protocol must collect failure rate data under each of these
conditions, many of which must be simulated for the test. Room for argument always exists
as to whether a simulation adequately models reality. Some of the testing, such as that for
steps (3) and (5), may not require actual flight, however. Programmers can create “test
cases” where they input several coordinates and inspect the algorithm’s output.
Requirements for any kind of compliance testing are controversial, even among engineers
skilled on the subject matter. 134 The same room for argument exists with respect to drone
autonomous safety system testing.

134
NHTSA's recent standard for electronic stability control on busses and trucks is a good example. The
final rule published in the federal register has more than a dozen pages devoted to arguments over test
standards in the proposed rule. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control
Systems for Heavy Vehicles, 80 Fed. Reg. 36,049 (final rule June 23, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
571).
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The cost of all this is considerable. Suppose 1,000 flights or other test cycles for each
condition are necessary to collect the data needed for statistical robustness. The actual
number may be much larger. Suppose a DROP, a reliability engineer, and a data analyst
are necessary for each series of tests. Suppose further that the replacement cost of the test
vehicle is $1,200, and that the vehicle loss rate during the tests is 10%. Finally, suppose
that the duration of each test flight is 20 minutes and that return-to-home can be triggered
every 5 minutes on each flight.
¶110
Those assumptions result in total test-flight time of 416.6 hours. 135 Assuming
personnel compensation of $30,000 annually for the DROP, $50,000 annually for the
reliability engineer, and $25,000 annually for the data analysis, labor cost for the testing
totals $21,872. 136
¶111
This is just one part of a comprehensive test protocol. Tests also must be designed to
determine how much return-to-home capability is achievable without a GPS lock by
reliance on the onboard IMU, or with onboard magnetometer and altimeter alone. An IMU
can record spatial movements from the launch point and therefore enable the drone to
retrace the path to return-to-home. A magnetometer and altimeter alone can allow a drone
to fly directly toward the launching point—assuming it knows where it is—but are
incapable of compensating for wind. Current devices also drift quickly, making them more
suitable for maintaining vehicle orientation than for navigation.
¶112
On the other hand, not every component has to be subjected to reliability testing if
the return-to-home subsystem includes particular component designs or off-the-shelf
components that have passed reliability testing with specified failure rates. A rotor blade
rated at 1,000 hours will not decrease the reliability of a system in which other critical
components have lives of 100 hours.
3. Data collection and analysis
¶113

Verifying flight characteristics and functionality of automated emergency protocols
requires data. One possibility is to require vendors to collect certain data and evaluate the
data according to certain criteria and algorithms. 137 This approach, however, steers the
drone certification process in the direction of traditional certification.
¶114
A less burdensome, performance-oriented approach would be to require the vendor
to collect "appropriate data" to allow it to evaluate system reliability.
¶115
All of the necessary data can be collected as a part of a presale flight-test program,
as it usually is for conventional airworthiness certification. But this is not necessary.
Thousands of vehicles with their relevant safety subsystems are already flying.

135

1,000 test flights, divided by 4 cycles per flight, multiplied by 20 minutes per flight, multiplied by 5
scenarios (excluding tests for steps (3) and (5)).
136
Total test time of 416.6 hours, divided by annual work hours of 2,000, multiplied by the sum of the
annual salaries for the three test professionals.
137
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LARGE SCHOOL BUS SAFETY
RESTRAINT EVALUATION,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/ESV/18/Files/18ESV-000313.pdf (illustrating
test data evaluation methodology); FED. AVIATION ADIM., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., AC 150/5370-11B, USE
OF NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING IN THE EVALUATION OF AIRPORT PAVEMENTS 37-69 (2011),
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/150_5370_11b.pdf
%5Bhttps://perma.cc/CR84-E4YC?type=source] (illustrating evaluation of test data).
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a) Having operational drones collect the data.—Most of the microdrones on the
market collect data on flight profiles and parameter values so that they can be fed down to
the DROP through a telemetry link (usually a channel on the control link). Many also
provide the option of uploading the data to a website so that one can review flight profiles
graphically or otherwise. Parrot was a pioneer in this with its first AR model, marketed in
early 2014. As more of these vehicles are sold and flown, an enormous stockpile of data is
collected. Determining the reliability of existing systems can make use of these data. It is
not clear that the data are being used effectively for this purpose, however.
Various regulatory options are conceivable to assure exploitation of the collected
data, enabling evaluation of existing systems, and targeting opportunities for improved
functionality and reliability. A mandatory data collection requirement is not necessary to
achieve this result. Any drone vendor has a self-interest in satisfying itself and its
customers—as well as regulators—that its vehicles are safe. The FAA could, following the
example of the FCC, prohibit sale of any drone for which the vendor has not issued a
certificate of conformity, certifying that the vendor has done whatever is necessary to
assure safety and the reliable operation of certain failsafe features. It would be left entirely
up to the vendor to determine the basis for such self-certification.
Then, either on a random spot check basis or only when the agency has reason to
believe that the certification is unwarranted, the vendor could be required to submit to the
FAA documentation of the basis for its self-certification. If the documentation shows that
the basis was inadequate, the FAA could impose remedial measures or prohibit sale of the
vehicle.
The advantage of this approach is that it does not interpose delays and unwarranted
costs before vendors market new technology. It aligns regulatory requirements with market
forces. Drone vendors already advertise product safety features, and this would enable
them to brag about data-based indicia of safety.
Using the safe-harbor approach suggested in Part V would allow vendors to work out
some tricky implementation issues. Under present systems, selection of data to be included
in downloadable telemetry is optional for the user. Similarly, whether a flight profile is
uploaded to the vendor or elsewhere is optional. Downlinking is necessary for uploading
to be possible; the vehicle is unlikely to have a direct Internet connection. Does that mean
that a drone must have an Internet connection before it will take off? That would radically
change the architecture and circumscribe available missions significantly. One way to deal
with this is to collect the captured data, not in real time, but periodically – whenever the
user does have an Internet connection.
Exactly how this should work is not ripe for regulatory prescriptions; the market
should allow experimentation in order to crystallize the best approach or approaches.
b) Mandatory data collection.—The suggested approach presents two challenges:
first, to make sure the data is captured; second, to make sure that it is recorded or
transmitted to the ground. The first challenge is easier to meet than the second. The
capability to capture the relevant data is not a problem: most microdrones on the market
capable of carrying cameras and performing commercial work capture data on position and
state of the GPS system. Typically, they allow the DROP to specify that some or all of
these data be downlinked to the DROPCON as telemetry. Many also record the data by
writing it to an onboard memory chip such as an SD card in the form of log files.
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DJI allows outsiders to develop applications with its SDK API. 138 The API provides
functionality similar to the 3Drobotics API. The DJI Matrice 100 is a developer kit to
experiment with code, sensors, and accessories on a specially designed quadrotor UAV
intended to interface with user application software.
¶124
Examining the 3D Robotics API reveals the capability for programmers to capture
and analyze data from the microdrone. (DJI’s programming language and API have similar
capabilities).
¶125
For example the class droneapi.lib.Attitude(pitch, yaw, roll) contains three
Parameters:
pitch – Pitch in radians
yaw – Yaw in radians
roll – Roll in radians
¶123

¶126

The class droneapi.lib.Battery(voltage, current, level) contains three other
Parameters:
voltage – Battery voltage in millivolts
current – Battery current, in 10 * milliamperes
level – Remaining battery energy

¶127

The class droneapi.lib.GPSInfo(eph, epv, fix_type, satellites_visible) provides
information available about GPS.
¶128
If there is no GPS lock the parameters are set to None; otherwise the parameters are:
eph (IntType) – GPS horizontal dilution of position (HDOP) in cm (m*100)
epv (IntType) – GPS horizontal dilution of position (VDOP) in cm (m*100)
fix_type (IntType) – 0-1: no fix, 2: 2D fix, 3: 3D fix
satellites_visible (IntType) – Number of satellites visible
¶129

The class droneapi.lib.Location(lat, lon, alt=None, is_relative=True) contains
latitude, longitude and altitude. The altitude is relative to either the home position or “mean
sea-level,” depending on the value of the is_relative.
¶130
For example, a location object might be defined as:
Location(41.879100, -87.642350, 30, is_relative=True)
¶131

Parameters:
lat – Latitude
lon – Longitude
alt – Altitude in meters (either relative or absolute)
is_relative – True if the specified altitude is relative to a ‘home’ location (this is
usually desirable). False to set altitude relative to “mean sea-level”

¶132

The API allows commands in the form of functions. The function takeoff(altitude)
causes the vehicle to take off and fly to the specified altitude (in meters) and then wait for
another command. 139
138
Guidance SDK: Empower Your Device with Vision, DJI, http://dev.dji.com/en/products/sdk/onboardsdk [https://perma.cc/RDY2-UP7G?type=source] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
139
DroneKit-Python API Reference, 3DR, http://python.dronekit.io/automodule.html
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3Drobotics provides programming code examples to do things such as following the
DROP. 140
The point is not that this kind of programming would take place after sale; rather the
code examples show the capability of existing software to perform the data capture and
recording proposed in the section. Moreover, evolution of the API will give access to more
values that make IMU calculations possible.
The present state of the market is far from what it should be. For example, DIY
Drones, an association of drone developers supported by 3DRobotics, offers an app called
droneshare, which enables a drone to upload flight path data and other parameters to an
Internet cloud maintained by a remote server. 141 Alternatively, it permits data to be
collected and transmitted to the cloud as soon as the DROPCON has an Internet connection.
Parrot offers AR.Drone Academy, which maintains a gallery of user-uploaded flight
profiles. 142 Archiving and sharing flight profiles and imagery is part of the overall
experience. DJI drones collect the data but make it difficult for a user to access or upload
them. DJI does not get the data unless the user figures out how to access the data files and
sends them to DJI. 143
But all of this is optional and—with respect to the most popular microdrones, those
from DJI—difficult. The DROP can choose whether to record or transmit the data. So
meeting the first challenge requires automatically generating log files. A vendor could
make data collection automatic, beyond the control of the user. It is difficult to ensure data
recording, however. Even if it is automatically programmed to occur, the DROP may
simply fail to insert an SD card. Designers can nullify this barrier to recording by
programming the drone not to take off unless a memory chip is installed.
Eventual uploading of data through the Internet is easier to assure. Because both DJI
and 3DR require firmware updates before the drone will fly, users must establish an
Internet connection. Uploading log data easily can be made an invisible prerequisite for
downloading the software update.
The proposed approach would capture and record data, not only about position and
state of the GPS system, but also flight path data from the IMU, and magnetometer and
barometric altimeter values. The frequency of data capture might be once per second—the
same as that transmitted by ADS-B out. 144

[http://perma.cc/8MYB-PD8Z] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
140
The above example, id., causes the vehicle to take off and fly to the specified altitude (in meters) and
then wait for another command.
141
Kevin Hester, Introducing Droneshare, the 3DR Cloud Flight and Fleet Management Service, DIY
DRONES BLOG (June 2, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://diydrones.com/profiles/blogs/new-droneshare-com-released
[http://perma.cc/VAN6-XFE8].
142
Parrot AR. Drone Academy, PARROT, http://ardrone2.parrot.com/ar-drone-academy/
[http://perma.cc/ZA93-KV2K] (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
143
Compare Inspire 1 Flight Data Logs, DJI FORUM (Jan. 19, 2015, 10:50 AM),
http://forum.dji.com/thread-5269-1-1.html [http://perma.cc/GH8E-MJXC] (reporting difficulties accessing
flight logs) and Pro/Adv Discussion, PHANTOM PILOTS, http://www.phantompilots.com/threads/telemetrydata-and-videos.38922/page-2 - post-368084 [http://perma.cc/WR9N-FTF2] (describing hex files generated
by Naza flight controller) with Tips to See Your Flight Records in App! Great!, DJI FORUM (Apr. 24, 2015,
1:16 AM), http://forum.dji.com/thread-12989-1-1.html[http://perma.cc/C38Q-THQS] (summarizing steps
to access flight records and to upload them to the cloud).
144
See Equip ADS-B – The Ins and Outs of ADS-B, FAA (June 29, 2015),
https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/ins_and_outs/ [http://perma.cc/TJE5-N7XT].
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The second challenge, ensuring the transmission of the data to the vendor, is more
difficult. Relying on DROPs to transmit flight data afterwards is insufficient. Some data
will and will not be transmitted, and the database thus would not contain a statistically
reliable sample of actual flight experience because it would contain only self-selected
samples. The system must automatically transmit the data to a repository. That could occur
in real time or automatically whenever a user connects to the vendor for such things as for
software updates. Real-time or near-real-time transmission is better. Such transmission
cannot occur in real time, however, unless the drone system has an Internet connection.
Internet connections may be active for other reasons: to enable moving-map displays of
GPS-determined position, or to support archives of flight profiles and imagery. Such
archives are part of the sales pitch by some vendors, 145 and feeding data to the archives is
attractive to some users. The same mechanisms for doing this can be required as part of the
performance standards for microdrone sale and distribution. Then, data would be recorded
whenever wireless Internet connectivity is available to the drone or the DROPCON.
If data transmission is not completely automatic, it could be the default, reinforced
by incentives to leave it enabled. Other consumer electronic vendors provide for uploading
of data in conjunction with operating system and application software performance. 146
Users could block the uploads because of privacy concerns until Windows 10, in which
users cannot turn off the data collection and uploads. 147
It is not hard to articulate such a requirement as part of the set of performance
requirements that microdrones must meet in order to be sold or distributed: "The vehicle
and its control systems must collect flight profile data and transmit it to a repository
controlled by the vendor. This collection and transmission must be beyond the control of
the operator.”
Several likely objections to such a requirement can be anticipated. First, a number of
commercial users and operators—especially in the agriculture industry—have already
expressed opposition to governmental or third-party access to their data, which they
consider to be proprietary. 148
Second, the amount of data collected and stored would be large, and could tax any
processing and analytical capability. 149 This second objection could be mitigated by
database algorithms that would screen incoming data for anomalies and discard everything
that appears fairly routine, or record only anomalies rather than all the data. An example
of such an algorithm is shown below.

145
See 3D ROBOTICS, http://3DRobotics.com[http://perma.cc/BCC4-H7XX] (last visited Sept. 13
2015).
146
Examples include Microsoft OneDrive, Apple’s iCloud, and DropBox.
147
Gregg Keizer, Windows 10 Makes Diagnostic Data Collection Compulsory, COMPUTER WORLD
(Apr. 10, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2968288/microsoft-windows/windows10-makes-diagnostic-data-collection-compulsory.html [http://perma.cc/LW29-TW84] (contrasting optional
data collection in previous versions of Windows with always-on data collection in Windows 10).
148
Gary Truitt, Farm Bureau Addresses Data and Technology Privacy Concerns of Farmers, HOOSIER
AG TODAY (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.hoosieragtoday.com/farm-bureau-addresses-data-and-technologyprivacy-concerns-of-farmers/ [http://perma.cc/7B44-L6NK].
149
If 50,000 drones are flown for five hours per week, and twenty 4-byte parameters are collected each
second, seventy-two gigabytes of data per week would be collected. Processing time, given a particular
speed of the processor, is proportional to the amount of data to be processed. Storage requirements are
proportional to the amount of data to be stored.
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If (problem) {
INSERT INTO table_name (column 1, column 2) VALUES (x,y);
}
¶144

The kind of accident data recording required of certain helicopter and airplane
operators is not suitable for drones. Black boxes—flight data recorders and cockpit voice
recorders—are useful only if they are recovered after a mishap. That is possible only if the
recorders are hardened to withstand a crash, which considerably increases their weight, and
if personnel are available to recover them. NTSB “Go-Teams” 150 are not going to be
investigating every drone flyaway and looking for black boxes—the hardened SD card on
the crashed drone.
F. Provide for product recalls

Federal agencies responsible for safety of consumer products, 151 motor vehicles, 152
pharmaceuticals, food, 153 motor homes, 154 marine vehicles, 155 and aircraft 156can compel
product recalls. 157
¶146
Authorizing the FAA to order recalls of drones that do not meet performance
standards could be a powerful incentive for vendors to do a better job of assuring
compliance before sale. 158
¶145

V. ADAPTING DRONE REQUIREMENTS
A. Setting the standard
¶147

Two alternatives exist. One is to let the market develop the data. The other is to
develop performance standards purely from theory. The difficulty with the theoretical

150
The Investigative Process, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD (last visited Sept. 13, 2015),
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/process/pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/C9JL-CEXR] (explaining
“Go Team” concept).
151
15 U.S.C. § 2064 (2012) (authorizing recalls). But see United States v. Zen Magnets, LLC, No. 15cv-00955, 2015 WL 2265385 (D. Colo. May 14, 2015) (granting injunction against sale of small magnets,
but expressing doubt about power to order recall of products already sold).
152
49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012) (authorizing NHTSA to order recalls for noncompliant motor vehicles); 49
U.S.C. § 30120 (2012) (requiring manufacturers of vehicles to repair, replace, or refund purchase price);
Ctr. for Auto. Safety, Inc. v. NHTSA, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004) (summarizing statutory authority of
NHTSA to order recalls).
153
21 U.S.C. § 350l (2012) (granting mandatory recall authority to FDA).
154
24 C.F.R. § 3282.407 (2015).
155
46 U.S.C. § 4310(f) (2012).
156
See FAA, Airworthiness Directive 2000-15-15, Docket No. 2000-NM-89-AD; Amendment 3911847; AD 2000-15-15, 65 Fed. Reg. 48355 (Aug. 8, 2000) (requiring inspection and, under some
circumstances, replacement of jack screw assembly on DC-9 aircraft). The FAA airworthiness directive
process is not generally referred to in terms of “product recall,” but that is the effect in many cases when an
AD prohibits flight until a system is replaced.
157
Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359, 363–366 (2013) (summarizing recall
authority).
158
Tavor White & Renata Pomponi, ¶ 54,363 “Best Practices” Net Lower Recall Rates, Study Finds,
CCH-CPSGD P 54363 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 3626105 (2015) (reporting on statistical study that showed
lower consumer product recall rates and costs for enterprises that did a better job of pre-sale design and
testing and noting high cost of recalls, often resulting in bankruptcy).
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approaches is obvious: there is no assurance that the resulting standard will be achievable
with any technology now available or likely to become available.
The market-based approach is reality: vendors deliver the kind of autonomous safety
features they think there is a demand for—almost all of them now include return-to-home.
Actual experience in the air teaches what is feasible, highlights the most common failures,
and shows what the costs of failure are. For example, Modovolate Aviation, LLC has lost
two microdrones because of flyaways. One was a DJI Phantom 2 Vision; the other was a
Parrot AR+. The Phantom had six hours total flight time before the flyaway occurred; the
AR+ had three hours. The cost of the Phantom was $1,200 while the AR+ was $700.
Neither vehicle was ever recovered, and to the best of the LLC’s knowledge, no damage to
persons or property on the ground occurred. The vehicles, however, were lost. So an
appropriate value to place on the malfunction is the cost of the lost vehicle, plus the value
of any attached accessories.
As § IV.D explains, a less burdensome approach involves self-certification, backed
up by periodic audits or inspections. That is the way much regulation in the United States
works, beginning with income taxation.
But how should a prudent self-certifier proceed? Can he rely wholly on engineering
estimates? Probably not; he probably should do some testing. But what test protocol should
he use? How much data is enough? How important is it to get some kind of independent
verification?
These are not novel questions. Anyone who designs and sells a new product must
consider them.
B. Proposed standard

¶152

Under existing law, an aircraft, including a drone, cannot be flown by anyone unless
it meets FAA airworthiness requirements or unless the FAA, under the authority of Section
333 of the 2012 Act, determines that airworthiness certification is unnecessary, as it has in
the Section 333 exemptions and as it proposes to do in the NPRM.
¶153
The FAA could implement this article’s proposal by issuing a blanket determination
under the authority of Section 333 that small UAS outside the micro UAS category are
airworthy if, and only if, they meet the following requirements:
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14 C.F.R. Part 107
Subpart E—Small Unmanned Aircraft Autonomous Safety Systems
§ 107.90
a. Small unmanned aircraft systems are deemed airworthy under Part 21 if,
and only if, they are equipped with the following autonomous safety
features:
b. GPS-enabled automatic land-immediately and return-to-home capability;
c. Backup land-immediately and return-to-home capability not dependent on
GPS lock; 159
d. Live collection of flight data and malfunction indications, automatically
recorded to non-volatile memory permanently installed on the vehicle and
the operator’s console as it is collected; 160
e. The capability to upload flight data and malfunction reports to the vendor
or to an Internet server accessible by the vendor; and
f. Vendor certification of compliance with these requirements.

¶154

It does not make any sense either to distinguishing between hobbyist and commercial
flight as the fundamental organizing principle for drone regulation or to regulate
commercial operations more heavily than hobbyist use. While commercial incentives may
draw more drone operations into the airspace, the commercial operators will be safer than
hobbyist operators because of their concerns about liability, their compliance with
insurance coverage limitations, and their unwillingness to jeopardize their certificates.
¶155
Traditional hobbyists may fly safely because they are embedded in the social matrix
of a model aircraft club. This is not the case with hobbyists who fly on their own,
unassociated with any club. A safe harbor strictly limited to hobbyist community events is
sound. Exempting those solo hobbyists who remain unassociated with any club, is not.
¶156
Reliance on advisory committees to develop a standard may seem like a good idea.
It is not. . 161 Relying on a consensus hammered out through a committee process that
reconciles conflicting views of stakeholders shields the FAA from political buffeting. It
takes considerable time, however, to develop a consensus, especially when participants
have limited time, and many are indifferent to delays occasioned by the committee process.
Reliance on committees is not working for drone regulation. The pace of the FAA’ drone
advisory committees has been excruciatingly slow, and the output modest in quantity and

159
This requirement would be satisfied by software that collects the necessary data from an onboard
IMU, magnetometer, and barometric altimeter so as to enable the drone to retrace its outbound flight path,
as explained in § IV.E.2.
160
The proposed rule requires recording on both the vehicle and on the operator’s console, because if the
control link is lost, the console will not receive what may be the most critical data about the malfunction in
the autonomous safety features. Alternatively, the vehicle may be lost in the mishap, in which case the only
recorded data would be on the operator’s console.
161
Advisory and Rulemaking Committees, FAA
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/ [http://perma.cc/JKK3MQAZ] (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (noting reliance on advisory committees for development of
regulations); NPRM, supra note 3, at 9545, 9551 (noting reliance on Aviation Rulemaking Committee
since 2008 for recommendations on drone regulation).
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quality. Standard setting by committee is cursed by process worshippers, who care far less
about timely results than whether detailed rules for committee deliberation are followed.
¶157
Decision-making by private committees is often worse than governmental decisionmaking; the FAA’s drone advisory committee process is an example. The RTCA Special
Committee 228, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, has issued only two white papers: one on command and control data links and the
other on detection and avoidance. Both of these papers were released in 2013, and are
available only if one pays $150. 162 Waiting for committee results to craft regulatory
standards would defer realization of drone potential by a decade or more.
¶158
Similarly, the ICAO is moving at a glacial pace. Its 2011 circular asserted the need
for international harmonization, but it did little more than review existing standards for
manned aircraft and speculate how they might apply to drones. 163
VI. TORT LAW ENFORCEMENT OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
¶159

Tort liability backs up any set of standards for drone design. Failure to satisfy
governmental safety standards is a powerful way for a plaintiff to show breach of the duty
of care. Indeed, the doctrine of negligence per se may make any violation of governmental
standards sufficient to establish that a defendant’s conduct fell below the reasonable
standard of care. 164 Even if the FAA does not promulgate a standard for vehicle and system
design, designers of vendors nevertheless are liable if a plaintiff can show negligent design,
negligent manufacture, or failure to warn. 165 Under the familiar elements of a negligence
cause of action, the plaintiff must establish a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, 166
that the defendant should have foreseen the risks of the injury that the plaintiff suffered,167
that the defendant failed to take reasonable measures that could have prevented that
injury, 168 that his failure to do so was the proximate cause of the injury, 169 and damages. 170
Products liability operates within the same general framework but adjusts the standards of
proof for some of the elements. 171
162
SC-228 Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, RTCA,
http://www.rtca.org/content.asp?contentid=178 [http://perma.cc/A5YF-QUN3] (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
163
See ICAO Circular 328 AN/190 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS/Documents/Circular 328_en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S3F2-33K5] (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
164
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 (2010) (“An actor is negligent if,
without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor's
conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965) (“The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may
be…established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation”); see Sibert-Dean v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 721 F.3d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (ruling that a bus driver’s failure to follow
regulations constituted negligence per se).
165
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805–806, 817 n.15 (1986) (distinguishing
ordinary negligence theories from per-se negligence theories and explaining how plaintiff can recover by
proof of negligence, without relying on negligence per se).
166
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010).
167
Id.
168
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A BURDEN OF PROOF (1965) (detailing elements plaintiff
must prove); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 NEGLIGENCE DEFINED (1965).
169
Id. § 328A(c) (requiring proof of proximate cause).
170
Id. § 328A(d) (requiring proof of damages).
171
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt (1998).
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To assure coherence with the example used in the rest of this article, assume that the
return-to-home function on a microdrone has malfunctioned, causing a flyaway and an
injury to a person on the ground. The victim sues the operator and the drone vendor. To
simplify the analysis, assume that the vendor designed, manufactured, and sold the drone
directly to the operator.
Two scenarios are plausible: the plaintiff may be the drone customer or a third-party
victim. Either type of victim claims that the vendor owed a duty of care to the victim. That
will not be hard to establish for the customer: following MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,172
negligence law has imposed duties on manufacturers running to customers in the chain of
distribution, even if they have no privity of contract with the manufacturer. 173
Manufacturers also have duties to third parties who foreseeably may be injured by product
malfunction. 174
Then, the victim—of whichever type—must establish the applicable standard of care
and that the vendor breached it. It is at that stage of the analysis that FAA's standards come
into play. Suppose the FAA issues a rule requiring all microdrones to have automatic
return-to-home systems that the DROP can trigger and that activate automatically when
the drone loses the control link or there are other signs of loss of control. The vendor will
argue that the vehicle in litigation had a return-to-home system and therefore complied
with the FAA standard. The defendant will further argue that states are preempted from
establishing, through their common law, standards that differ from those established by the
FAA. The preemption argument is compelling. 175
So then the battle will be over the FAA’s performance standard. Subsequent sections
in this analysis explore the implications of a more detailed performance standard, but
initially, suppose it just says that the drone must have automatic return-to-home capability.
What does that mean? Some extreme interpretations can be ruled out. Surely the drone
would not satisfy the standard if the drone vendor argued only that it was possible for a
DROP to fly the drone back manually. The standard says “automatic.” Some automation,
surely, is required. At the other extreme, the standard is not likely to be a source of absolute
liability—one that the vendor breaches if the drone is struck by lightning or flies inside of
a tunnel that blocks the GPS signal. Both of these risks are arguably foreseeable, but no
feasible design would reduce them significantly. That would leave open, however, the
question of whether the vendor has satisfied its duty to warn. 176
Under what range of conditions and with what level of reliability must a compliant
return-to-home system function correctly? That is the main issue in this factual and legal
172

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Id.; Minton v. Krish, 642 A.2d 18, 21 (Conn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying MacPherson to hold that
contractor could be held liable for injuries to third party resulting from door although door had been
accepted by owner of premises).
174
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 (1965) (“An act is negligent if the actor intends it to affect,
or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the conduct of another, a third person, or an animal in
such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other.”).
175
Henry H. Perritt Jr. & Albert J. Plawinski, One Centimeter Over My Back Yard: Where Does
Federal Preemption of State Drone Regulation Start?, 17 N.C.J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming Dec. 2015).
176
See Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877 n.4 (Cal. 1984) (affirming judgment
for damages against aircraft manufacturer on negligence per se and failure to warn theories; state tort
damages for violation of FAA standard not preempted); Rehler v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 777 F.2d 1072 (5th
Cir. 1985) (affirming judgment on jury verdict for manufacturer; reviewing proof and jury instructions of
negligent design, failure to warn, and misrepresentation of flat-spin danger).
173

34

Vol. 14:1]

¶165

¶166

¶167

¶168

¶169

¶170

¶171

Henry H. Perritt et al.

battle. In fighting it, the plaintiff has an advantage if the defendant did little, if any, testing,
or if the defendant's tests did not cover a reasonable range of likely flight conditions. Expert
witnesses from both sides will help establish what a reasonable flight test program
comprises, likely—at least on the plaintiff’s side—using traditional airworthiness flighttest standards as a benchmark. One expert will explain why the manufacturer cannot design
against GPS signal loss in tunnels, while the other side will introduce evidence of
alternatives that are easy to design to avoid signal drop out.
Because a drone can lose—or fail to acquire—a GPS lock in the first place, under
many operational circumstances, a defendant may be persuasive in arguing that the
particular risk that caused the flyaway could not have been prevented by any reasonable
measure. The plaintiff will respond that the vendor could have designed a vehicle so that it
would not take off without a GPS lock that could not be overridden by the DROP. He will
also argue that a variety of autonomous safety modes would have prevented the accident if
they had been triggered automatically by a lost GPS lock in-flight, such as relying on IMU,
magnetometer, and altimeter data to fly back to the launching position.
If the vendor self-certifies compliance with the standard without much basis for
doing so, a customer-plaintiff has an additional claim for negligent misrepresentation
(assuming that legal theory is recognized under the applicable state law). 177 Likewise, such
a well-represented plaintiff will claim failure to warn in addition to negligent design and
manufacture because weakness of one strengthens the other. Whatever risks the defendant
establishes as reasonable under the negligent design theory, the plaintiff can challenge the
inadequacy of the warning about them.
Third party plaintiffs, however, are unlikely to have either misrepresentation or
failure to warn claims; any representations would not have been made to them, and any
warning would not have been communicated to them.
The result is an enforcement mechanism that does not require any FAA or local law
enforcement resources to back up a performance standard for drone safety. The more
detailed the performance standard, the more powerful adherence to it will be as a defense
in the negligence action. The more the vendor has deviated from the performance standard,
the greater the likelihood of liability.
This approach does not require any kind of agency preapproval for sale, and it leaves
how many resources to invest in presale compliance testing and validation entirely up to
the vendor. The vendor is perfectly free to get a new technology on the market and hope it
works reliably. Victims of errant drones are free to decide what is worth fighting about;
only a handful will file lawsuits. Public resources embedded in the judicial system are
targeted on mishaps that actually have consequences.
This approach represents a way to embrace enforceable performance standards
without imposing additional prescriptive burdens for testing and pre-approval. And it is
already there, embedded in the common law.
In litigation over a drone mishap, the plaintiff should have the burden of proof with
respect to the cause of any mishap. In the case of a customer-plaintiff, if the plaintiff’s
vehicle had the ability to send telemetry to the vendor or the cloud and the plaintiff did not

177
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 9 (1998) (describing liability for fraudulent,
negligent, and innocent misrepresentations of products).
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activate it, the plaintiff’s position is weak. The theory is not exactly last clear chance 178or
assumption of the risk; 179 collecting data would not have prevented the mishap. Data from
the flight merely enables proof, and the defendant has the burden of proof once the plaintiff
proves causation. 180
¶172
If the plaintiff is a third-party and the vendor did not take reasonable action to ensure
collection and preservation of flight data, res ipsa loquitor should operate against the
vendor, creating a presumption that flight anomalies resulted from the vendor’s fault. 181 If
the vendor did collect data, it is, of course, discoverable by the third-party plaintiff.

178

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 480 (1965) (allowing the plaintiff to recover when the plaintiff
perceived the danger but did not have the opportunity to avoid own peril).
179
Id. § 496A (barring plaintiff’s recovery when he perceives the risk and proceeds).
180
See Galanek v. Wismar, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (restating general rule that
burden shifts to defendant to show product is not defective when plaintiff proves causation; reversing
nonsuit against plaintiff).
181
Compare Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 40–41 (Cal. 1975) (affirming directed verdict for
plaintiff on res ipsa loquitur theory establishing pilot fault) and Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 245 N.E.2d
388, 391–392 (N.Y. 1969) (affirming judgment on jury verdict for plaintiff against helicopter pilot on res
ipsa loguitur theory) with Sievers v. Beechcraft Mfg. Co., 497 F. Supp. 197, 202–203 (E.D. La. 1980)
(explaining that res ipsa not available against manufacturer when negligence by pilot or other factors
besides manufacturer fault could have caused accident).
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